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Railroadsin Cities; Rights of:Property-oirners;Poweirof the Leg slature
over Streets, and Right to grant Franchis therein; Fe of the StetsConstitntionality and Validity of Act of Aril 17, 1860, charteringBrolway Railroad Coniamny.-The legislature, in'passing the Act of April 17,
1860, authorizing the construction of a railroad in the Seventh Avenue,
and in certain other streets, &c., in the city of 'Ncw York, assumed the
right'to grant the franchise absolutely and iineouditionally, so far as the
occupation of the streets and avenues for the purposis of the railroad was
involved, without compensation being made to the owners of'any interest
in the land forming the streets: The Pcople and others vs. Kerr and
others, and the .Mlaior, &c.; of the City of.iew Thork. "
The act is not void as being r'epugnant to the constitutioal prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use, without compensation: d.
The fhe of the streets and avenues resides in the corporation of the
city of New York, in trust, to be kept open for ever as streets for the use
of the public: .I17.
The trust vested in the corporation prodeeded from the sovereign power,
either of the crown of Great Britain, or of the state of New York, or from
both; and exists for the use and benefit of all tie people of the state, who
are the beneficiaries or cestuis gue irust for whom the 'trust was created,
and by wioni, through their legislature, it is sustained and continued: Id.
The 1ower to exempt the grantees from the payment of any damages
or compensation for the franchise granted by the Act 6f April 17, 1860,
was clearly within the scope of legislative authority: Id.
The occupation of the streets for the purpose of constructing and operating the railroad authorized by that'act, does not involve the taking of
property, in such a sense as to come within the prohibition of the constitution; which implies, first, a private owner; second, a taking from him;
and, third, the property or thing taken having the legal qualities of property, and the owaer's interest in which is capable of legal estimate : Id.
The streets are not in the hands of private owners, and what is authorized by the act to be-taken is not private property. The grant in the
statute is of a franchise. And -the act authorizing the grantces to coastruct and operate the railroad is a mere legislative liconse to do so: hi.
IFrom the Ion. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in the 371h volume of his
Reports.
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The state iegislatures have unlimited power over public rights in high
ways; and can obstruct, modify, impair, or extinguish them, as to any
highway, or portion of a highway, except so far as the state power is qualified by the commercial clause in the Constitution of the United States,
without making any compensation to individuals for resulting or consequential damages: Id.
It also had the constitutional power to authorize the grantees to construct and operate the railroad, through or upon the streets of the city,
without the consent of the city corporation: Id.
Compulsorj Arbitratons.-The legislature has no right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for damages for breach of a contract,
out of the funds or property of such corporation, without a submission of
such claim to a judicial tribunal: The People, ex rel. Baldwin et al., vs.
flaws, Comptroller of the City of New York.
Where the law compels a party to arbitrate, upon a claim which properly should be the subject of an action, without his assent, such law deprives him of the right which is secured by the constitution, of a trial
according to the course of the common law; and performance of the award
will not be enforced by mandamus: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Morigage-flomestead Exemption-Sae under Power.-A mortgage
of land which is subject to a right of homestead conveys the reversionary
interest of the mortgagor, after the expiration- of the homestead estate,
although his wife did not join therein: Smith vs. Provin.
The mortgagee of a reversionary interest in land may maintain a bill in
equity to redeem a prior mortgage : Id.
No title passes by a sale under a power of sale contained in a mortgage.
unless the conditions thereof are strictly complied with: Id.
Agent-Action against by Princal.-A principal may recover, in an
action of tort against his agent, for all the damages caused by the latter's
breach of duty, including his neglect to pay over on demand money which
lie has collected as agent: Ashley v. Root.
Rbrged Signature- Adoption of- Evidence of Adoption - Lett
2nailed.-RBy ratifying and adopting a forged signature upon commercial
paper, the person whose signature has beeir forged becomes liable thereon,
although no words of agency appear upon the paper, and no facts arc
I From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in the 4th volume of his
Reports.
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shown sufficient to constitute an estoppel in pais: Greenfield Bank vs
Crafts.
If competent'circumstantial evidence, tending to prove an adoption and
ratification of a forged signature by one who knew all the material facts,
has been submitted to a jury under proper instructions, their verdict find.
ing that the adoption and ratification were proved will not be set aside on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant it, for the reason
that the paper bearing the forged signature was not presented to the party
whose name it bore, and no express declaration was made by him that he
would adopt and ratify it, and the circumstances proved might leave the
question doubtful in the opinion of the court: Id.
If a letter has been sent by the post, there is ordinarily no presumption
that it reached its destination and was received by the person to whom it
was addressed, though living at the place and usually receiving his letters
there; but it should be left to the jury to determine; upon all .the evidence, whether it was in fact received: Id.
lhsurance-Negligence of Insured.-lcre negligence on the part of a
person insured, which is the direct cause of a loss by fire, is not a defence
to an action upon the policy, if he acted in good faith, and- his negligence
did not amount to recklessness and wilful misconduct: Johnson vs. Berkshire Ins. Co.
Railroadc-Negligenceof Parentsof Chld-Evidencc.-Thenegligence
of a parent or other person who has the care of a-child of tender years has
the same effect in preventing the maintenance of an action by the child
for an injury occasioned by the negligence of others that his own want of
due care would- have, if the plaintiff were an adult. And to entitle the
plaintiff to recover-in such case, it is incumbent on him to prove that there
'was no other cul'pable cause of the injury than the negligence of the defendants: Wrfght vs. Milalden Railroad Co.
The fact that a child of two years old is passing unattended across a
public street, in a city traversed by a horse railroad, is, in and of itself,
necessarily, prima facie evidence of neglect in those who have it in
charge: Id.
In an action against a horse railroad company to recover for a personal
injury caused by their running over with a car a child of two years of age
in a public street, in a city, in which the evidence shows that the child
was passing across the street unattended, it is sufficient ground for a new
in reply to a request by the de.
trial, after a verdict for the plaintiff, if,
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fendauts for an instruction that it is negligcnce to permit a child of this
age to go on a public street, the judge instructs the jury that, if the parents: knowing the position of the child and its &oger, had the means of
preventing the injury and neglected to use them, and permitted the child
to remain in danger, the plaintiff cannot recover; and that the mere fact
that a child was passing across the street unattended is not, in and of itself,
necessarily such evidence of fault or neglect as entitles the defendants to
a verdict: Id.
In such action, the plaintiff may introduce in evidence a city ordinance,
regulating and limiting the speed of cars upon horse railroads, which has
been served upon the defendants, with proof that, at the time of the injury
complained of, the defendants' servant was driving at a greater rate of
speed: Id.
Parent and Clld-Emancipation.-Anemancipation of a minor child
by parol agreement and without consideration is revocable, until acted
upon: Abbott vs. Converse.
Guardian and Ward-Domicil of Ward.-If a minor leaves the
domicil of his origin with the consent of his guardian and lives for two
consecutive years exclusively in another town, considering it as his home,
with no definite intent on the part of his guardian to cause him to return,
he acquires a new domicil in the latter place, and his property is properly
taxable there: Kirkland vs. Inhabitantsof Ihately.
Selectmen of Town-Antlzority.-The selectmen of a town have no
authority to lay out a private way "to be used only during the time of
sleighing :" Holcomb vs. Moore.
A'atural Stream-Righit of Owner to use offor Mills, &c.-The owner
of land over which a natural stream of water flows has a right to the reasonable use of the water for mills or other purposes, whatever may be the
effect upon the owners of lands below; and he is not liable to an action
for obstructing and using the water for his mill, if it appears that his dam
is only of such magnitude as is -adapted to the size and capacity of the
stream and to the quantity of water usually flowing therein, and that his
mode of using the water is not unusual or unreasonable, according to the
general custom of the country in cases of dams upon similar streanis:
Cilty of SP-ligfield vs. .arris.
Railroad Company-Liability as Warehousemen. or Common Carriers-Courseof Business on Roads along the same Route.-If anything
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remains to be done by the consignor of goods or his agents after their delivery to a railroad company, before they are ready for transportation, the
company are only responsible for them as warehousemen, and not as com"
mon carriers : Judson vs. trestern. Railroad Co.
If an arrangement or course of business exists between two railroad
companies whose roads are upon the same general route, but do not actually
onmect with each other by which goods, which hiave been carried to the
termination of one road, and are destined to some point upon or beyond
-he line of the other, are delivered to the second company with a bill of
the expenses already incurred, from which, if found to be correct, a waybill is made out, the second company are only responsible as warehousemen, and not as common carriers, for goods so received and stored by
them, until the delivery of the bill of expenses: Id.
SUPREME

COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.'

Assignment- Conflict of Laws- Trover by Assignees againstan Officer
for. attaching Goods assigned-Damages.-A voluntary assignment of
personal property situated in Massachusetts, with preferences, valid in
Rhode Island, but void by the laws of Massachusetts, was made in Rhode
Island by an insolvent firm composed of members who were citizens of
that state, for the benefit of their creditors. After the assignees, who
were also citizens of Rhode Island, had taken possession of the property,
it was seized by a deputy sheriff in Massachusetts as the property of the
assignors, upon a writ of attachment issued against. them out of the Superior Court of that state, and delivered to him for service, in which writ
the plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts, but the cause of action was a
promissory note made by the assignors in Rhode Island to a citizen of
Rhode Island, who held it at the time of the assignment, and afterwards
indorsed it, when overdue, to the plaintiff in the attachment suit. At the
time of the attachment the deputy sheriff was notified of the title of the
assignees by the person whom they had left in charge of the go6ds, and
on the same day refused to permit one of the assignees to examine the
goods attached. The next day the goods were attached by the same
deputy as the property of the assignors, in another suit, brought
against them in the same court, by a citizen of Massachusetts, upon a debt
due to him from the assignors' prior to the- assignment, in which the
(Court-overruling a plea in abatement filed by the assignors to the service of the writ, which set up that the property attached did not belong
I

From Ion. Samuel Ames, Reporter; to appear in the 4th volume of his Reports.
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to them-gave judgment against them, and the property was sold, partly
under an order of a judge as perishable, and partly on an execution issued
in the last-named action-the first having been abandoned-and the proceeds applied by the deputy, first, to the payment of a mortgage upon the
goods attached made by the assignors, and the residue to the payment
p.ro tanto of the execution. In trover by the assignees against the deputy
sheriff, it was Held, that inasmuch as the assignment was valid in Rhode
Island, and was executed in that state by citizens thereof, it conveyed the
personal property of the assignors in Massachusetts, and that its validity
could not have been.questioned by the first attaching creditor, whose debt
was a Rhode Island debt at the time of the assignment, and was bound.
by it.
Held further, that the title -to the goods attached being thus in the
assignees, as between them and the first attaching creditor, the taking by
the deputy sheriff of the goods upon the first writ against the assignors
was tortious, and, whether he knew of the title of the assignees or not, a
conversion of the goods in itself; and that, notwithstanding the subseq-dent
attachment of the goods upon a cause of action adjudged in 'Massachusetts to
render them attachable as the property of the assignors, and the application
of the proceeds of the goods under judgment to the payment of the debt of
the second attaching creditor, the deputy sheriff was liable to the assignees
for the value of the goods at the time of the first attachment, deducting
therefrom the amount of the mortgage upon the goods paid out of the
proceeds thereof, with interest, by way of damages, upon the balance,
thereafter : Bunt vs. Lathrop.
Covenant-Easements-Damages.-Wherethe tenants in common of a
parcel of land laid out into building lots, eonveye i to a city by deed-poll
a strip of the land running through the centre of the parcel, for a high.
way, and called it Halsey Street, and in the same deed inserted the following clause :-" And it is hereby expressly understood, covenanted, and
agreed by the said grantors, for themselves and their heirs and assigns,
respectively, for ever, that no building of any description shall at any
time for ever hereafter be erected, placed, or put within eight feet of said
Halsey street, or of either side thereof." .Held, that the clause was a
mutual covenant between the tenants in common, and should be construed
as a grant in fee to each, of a negative easement in the lands of all, restricting the right to build, within the specified limits, which could be enforced between the tenants in common, their heirs and assigns, at law and in equity;

